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TmNKING ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION AT THE CUSP 
by 
Mark Tushnet* 
One could deal with a number of topics under the heading "Edu-
cation and the Constitution." As some articles in this symposium do, one 
could describe the way substantive constitutional law deals with education, 
or one could describe the ways in which educators teach about the Consti-
tution. My topic is somewhat different because I will be focusing on what 
we might have to teach about - that is, the object on which we focus our 
pedagogical efforts - in the next decades. I want to begin by suggesting 
that what we teach about may be less important than how we teach. To 
use a somewhat hackneyed phrase in teaching, we model our judgments 
about appropriate civic behavior for our students. Thurgood Marshall un-
derstood the importance of modeling civic behavior when he argued the 
plaintiffs' side in Cooper v. Aaron. l The case involved the integration of Lit-
tle Rock's Central High School. The school had been integrated for a 
year, during which troops were stationed in the corridors. The district 
judge had granted the school board's motion to suspend desegregation. 
The city's attorneys took the position that there were good educational 
reasons for delaying desegregation. 'How', they asked, 'could students get 
a decent education in a school occupied by troops?' At one point in the 
argument, Marshall stated: 
Education is not the teaching of the three R's. Education 
is the teaching of the overall citizenship, to learn to live 
together with fellow citizens, and above all to learn to 
obey the law. We talk about public education .... I do not 
know of any more horrible destruction of principle of citi-
zenship than to tell young children that those of you who 
withdrew, rather than to go to school with Negroes, those 
of you who were punished last year, the few that the 
School Board did punish, "Come back, all is forgiven, you 
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University 
Law Center. An earlier version of this essay was presented as the keynote ad-
dress at the Conference on Education and the Constitution, University of Akron 
School of Law, March 29-31, 2000. I benefited from comments at the Confer-
ence and from comments by participants at a faculty workshop at the University 
of Pittsburgh Law School. 
1 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
21 
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win." Therefore, I am not worried about Negro children 
in these states. . . . I worry about the white children in 
Litde Rock who are told, as young people, that the way to 
get your rights is to violate the law and defy the lawful au-
thorities. I am worried about their future. I don't worry 
about the Negro kids' future. They have been struggling 
with democracy long enough. They know about it.2 
In saying that education was about more than the three R's, Mar-
shall was pointing to what some education scholars have called the 
schools' implicit curriculum - the things that are taught by, or through, 
the way a school room is organized, the way teachers and students treat 
each other, and the like.3 For Marshall, the most important constitu-
tional lesson students in Litde Rock could learn was not what they would 
read in some civics textbook, but what they would experience as they at-
tended desegregated classes with each other. 
Marshall's understanding that schools have an implicit curriculum 
might be a better guide to thinking about what we should teach about 
the Constitution in this century than any substantive points I might 
make. One controversial example may illustrate Marshall's understand-
ing: just as he asked what lesson would be taught by delaying desegrega-
tion, so we might ask, "What lesson will be taught about the nature of 
our constitutional community if we adopt a large-scale system of vouch-
ers that parents can use to assist them in sending their children to non-
public schools?" Such a system would demonstrate - and would teach 
our children and grandchildren - a number of constitutional values. It 
would show how important we think it is to make available a wide range 
of choices to as many people as possible without much regard to their 
wealth.4 It would also show that we do not think it all that important to 
develop common institutions in which people come together in an activ-
ity of civic engagement. My point here is modest and it does not go to 
the question of whether voucher systems as a whole are either desirable 
or constitutional. Voucher systems would be part of the implicit curricu-
lum about the Constitution, and that fact is something to think about. 
2 Transcript of Oral Argument at 91-92, Cooper, 358 u.s. 1 (1950). 
3 For a reference to the implicit curriculum in the legal literature, see Howard 
Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The World of Law and Lawyering as Portrayed in 
the Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law School Curriculum, 37 UCLA L. REv. 1157, 
1160 n.3 (1990). 
4 That is, rich people already have a wide range of choices; a voucher system 
makes that range available to people who lack equivalent wealth. 
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Though the implicit curriculum may be, as Marshall suggested, 
more important than the explicit one, I must place it in the background 
so that I can deal with topics about which I am better informed. I turn 
to two matters that I think will be important in shaping the Constitution 
over the next few years. The first is rather narrow and perhaps overly ori-
ented to those of us who teach constitutional law in law schools, but it 
did provide me with the metaphor for the title of this article. 
What do I mean in saying that we need to think about the Con-
stitution "at the cusp?" I have in mind an image in which we have one 
way of thinking about the Constitution on one side of a line, and an-
other way of thinking about the Constitution on the other. My sense is 
that we may have crossed such a line quite recently. I believe that we 
may be in a new constitutional order, different from the New Deal-Great 
Society constitutional order that existed from 1937 to sometime in the 
1980s.5 If so, those of us who have been teaching constitutional law for a 
long time may find ourselves in the position of law professors in 1938 
and 1939, whose way of thinking about the Constitution was developed 
in the 1920s: we are intimately familiar with a whole raft of cases that 
simply do not have much to do with the Constitution in this new consti-
tutional order. A law professor who said in 1940 that the farm program 
at issue in Wickard v. Filburn6 would be unconstitutional under the stan-
dards the Court used in the 1920s might have been right, but his state-
ment would also have been profoundly irrelevant. I sometimes have the 
same feeling about critical comments about the Supreme Court's recent 
work: the criticisms are that the Court's current actions are not what the 
Court would have done ten years ago, and that the Court's actions are 
inconsistent with the way most law professors have come to understand 
the Constitution. This criticism may be true enough, but it is perhaps 
profoundly irrelevant. 
To elaborate on this, I will describe what I mean by a constitu-
tional order and then I will explain why I think we may be in a new one. 
I will conclude this part of the essay by sketching out what I think may 
be the characteristics of this new order. 
My idea of constitutional orders is related to, but different from, 
Bruce Ackerman's idea that we have experienced several constitutional 
moments that have transformed our constitutional system.7 Ackerman fo-
cuses on the moments of transition and elevates them to constitutional 
status. I am more concerned about what happens between the constitu-
5 For my development of this argument, see Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New 
Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARv. L. 
REv. 29 (1999). 
6 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
7 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). 
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tional moments. As I see it, constitutional orders are relatively stable ar-
rangements of the fundamental institutions of politics in our society. 
They include such things as the degree to which the president is inde-
pendent of or dependent upon Congress for election and reelection, the 
unity or division in the major parties, and the role of interest groups in 
the development of public policy. I should emphasize that these features 
are political, and not constitutional in any traditional sense. For exam-
ple, there is nothing in the Constitution that dictates whether the major 
parties will be united or divided. However, constitutional orders are con-
stitutional nonetheless, because they describe the way the political order 
actually functions over some reasonably long period. I believe, constitu-
tional orders understood in this way elicit different rules of constitu-
tional law, as it is understood in the traditional sense. 
The mechanism by which substantive constitutional law is con-
nected to constitutional orders is straightforward. Individual judges in 
the United States are independent of direct political control, but the 
federal judiciary is not structurally independent of all political control 
because its members are nominated by the president and are confirmed 
by the Senate. Over time, the composition of the federal judiciary will be 
affected by what I have called fundamental political arrangements.s To il-
lustrate the structural connections, consider the appointment and nomi-
nation process in early 2000. For nearly eight years, we had a president 
from the Democratic party, and for nearly six years, we had a Senate 
controlled by the Republican party, whose conservative members have 
been quite concerned about the composition of the federal judiciary. 
Under these circumstances, one can predict that the people who become 
judges will be technically proficient and largely non-ideological. As politi-
cal scientist Mark Silverstein and others have argued, this is likely to be 
true as long as there is a reasonably close party division in the Senate, 
even if it and the presidency are in the hands of the same party.9 The 
reason for this is that interest groups have come to pay attention to judi-
cial appointments in a way they did not in the past.· Naming a con trover-
8 To a certain degree - sometimes a greater degree, sometimes a smaller one 
- the judges themselves are sensitive to changes in the political system, and 
take them into account when shaping constitutional law. That is, sometimes 
judges will be reasonably self-conscious in saying to themselves, "Things have 
changed in the general political order, and we as judges have some obligation 
to change as well.» 
9 MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF THE SUPREME COURT 
CONFIRMATIONS (1994) (focusing on the confirmation process); DAVID ALISTAIR 
YALOF, PuRSUIT OF JUSTICE: PRESIDENTIAL POUTICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME 
COURT NOMINEES (1999) (focusing on the President's initial selection of 
nominees). 
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sial nominee to the courts becomes politically costly, and in general, 
presidents will select "safe" candidates to limit the costs these nomina-
tions - usually fairly low on a President's political priority list - incur. to 
This example identifies one of the underlying structural features 
of the new constitutional order. It is the more-or-Iess permanent state of 
divided government we have chosen for ourselves. II What are some of 
the other features? Probably the most important is the high degree of 
polarization in Congress. The center of the Republican caucus is farther 
to the right than the public is, and the center of the Democratic caucus 
is farther to the left - or, more precisely, more committed to a new, neo-
liberal program. The reasons for this polarization are complex. Candi-
dates are selected in primary elections in which only party activists vote, 
and not surprisingly activists are more conservative or liberal than non-
activists. 
Reapportionment under the constraints of the one-person, one-
vote rule, coupled with new developments in computer technology, have 
made it possible to draw districts in which the election of the dominant 
party's candidate is close to guaranteed. Taken together, these two points 
mean that the party caucuses will always have a hard core of people to 
the right or to the left of the party and the public. And that hard core 
will dominate what happens in Congress because of changes over the 
past decades in Congress' internal organization. In a capsule, party lead-
ers in Congress have regained the power they had lost in reforms 
adopted in the 1970s. But, as leaders, they depend on their party 
caucuses for their positions. Because the hard core dominates the cau-
cus, the leaders develop and promote ideologically polarized programs. 
I think it is important to stress that these features of our political 
system are new, at least when we take a sufficiently expansive historical 
view. The present constitutional order was preceded by the New Deal 
and Great Society, where Democrats dominated both Congress and the 
presidency.12 Party unity is also a new phenomenon. Franklin Roosevelt 
and John F. Kennedy had to ride herd on congressional Democratic par-
ties that included conservative Southerners and urban Northern liberals. 
The Republican party used to have significant representation from those 
who were known as Rockefeller Republicans. This is no longer true; con-
\0 Although sometimes a president will find the cost of controversy offset by 
some partisan benefits from the nomination. 
11 I should note that it turns out to be quite difficult to figure out why we have 
had a divided government for so long, but the fact is there .. 
12 The Republicans who occupied the White House - both Dwight Eisenhower 
and Richard Nixon - accepted the larger premises of the New Deal and Great 
Society political order. This assessment of Richard Nixon may be somewhat con-
troversial today, but I believe it likely to be the judgment of history. 
HeinOnline -- 34 Akron L. Rev. 26 2000-2001
26 AKRON LAw REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
servative Southern Democrats have become Republicans,13 and there are 
only a handful of liberal Republicans left in Congress. 14 As the remarka-
ble degree of party unity during President Clinton's impeachment and 
trial demonstrated, party outliers have reason to come into line on im-
portant issues because of the power that party leaders have within 
Congress. 
One final aspect of the new constitutional order is its basic policy 
orientation. The new order, I believe, results from the consolidation of 
the Reagan policy revolution that occurred with the election of President 
Clinton. As the head of the Democratic Leadership Council, President 
Clinton developed a set of policies that were historically consistent with 
the Democratic party's basic commitments, but that also acknowledged 
the transformation of the policy landscape that took place during Presi-
dent Reagan's term. 
There are other features of the new constitutional order, but the 
features I describe above should be enough to indicate what the new 
constitutional order looks like. What are its implications for constitu-
tional law? I have used the term "chastened" to describe the new consti-
tutional order. Looking at Congress and the presidency, what we are 
likely to get in the way of legislation is some tinkering with existing pro-
grams, no major new initiatives, and the elimination of no major pro-
grams from the past. To the extent that there is a substantive theory un-
derlying the chastened constitutional order, its constitutional values -
notably including distributive justice - are likely to be promoted by a 
slightly larger emphasis than in the recent past on the ability of loosely 
regulated markets to achieve those goals. 
As my comments on judicial selection indicate, we are not likely 
to see many bold initiatives coming from the courts. This may be a sur-
prising claim in light of the attention the Supreme Court's recent feder-
alism decisions have received. Even in the aggregate, however, the deci-
sions are not all that important. 15 Doctrinally, the Court's continued 
13 Some of them, such as Senator Richard Shelby, switched parties in a quite vis-
ible way. 
14 There are more liberal Republicans in the Senate than in the House, but still 
few relative to how many there used to be. 
15 I believe this to be particularly true of the Court's recent Eleventh Amend-
ment decisions, which have done nothing more than eliminate one mechanism 
for ensuring that states comply with national law, without casting any doubt on 
the states' obligation to so comply. The eliminated enforcement mechanism -
damage suits by injured private parties - may be quite useful, as Congress 
thought it was, but other enforcement mechanisms do exist. Prospective injunc-
tive relief, for example, means that states will be under enforceable duties to 
comply with national law. Of course, it is possible for the Court to push the 
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acceptance of Wichanl, when the national government regulates commer-
cial activities, means that the permissible scope of national regulation 
will remain quite broad. Again doctrinally, the Court's position in United 
States v. Lopez.16 and in United States v. Morrisonl7 is that there must be 
something to which Congress' power does not extend if the premises of 
the 1789 Constitution are to remain valid. An aggressive Court might 
provide a great deal of content to that "something." There is no particu-
lar reason to believe that, in a world where Congress and the President 
are already committed to reducing national initiatives, the Court will feel 
any need to be aggressive. 
A second defense of the claim that the Court's recent decisions 
are not all that important is that we might be experiencing a phenome-
non of the transition between one constitutional order and another. The 
idea here is that the Court might be acting aggressively to invalidate leg-
islation enacted when the old Great Society constitutional order was in 
place, to make the statute books look the way they should in the new 
constitutional order. The statutes it has been striking down are those 
that are unlikely to have been enacted in the circumstances of the new 
constitutional order. 18 
Another qualification may be more important. Suppose the new 
constitutional order is indeed chastened. I have suggested structural rea-
sons for thinking that the courts will also be chastened or, in more tradi-
tional terms, restrained. However, a different scenario is clearly possible. 
The courts might agree that the government should be chastened -
that is, that it should not undertake expansive interventions in the mar-
ket. But the courts might also take their role to be guaranteeing that 
government actually is chastened. They might aggressively police the 
boundaries of government power to ensure that we get the kind of chas-
tened government to which we are entitled. In this scenario, we might 
Eleventh Amendment decisions much more radically - to use them to support 
decisions holding that states need not comply with national regulation or to re-
duce sharply the availability of prospective injunctive relief. It is clear that the 
Court has not yet gone that far. 
16 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
17 United States v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1578 (2000). 
18 Consider both the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000-bb (1994), and the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13701 
(1994). One might plausibly see both as the products of interest-group domina-
tion of the national political process, a characteristic of the New Deal-Great So-
ciety political order but, arguably, not a characteristic of the new order. The 
Court's decisions invalidating those statutes could then be understood as align-
ing the statute books with the new order. 
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see the courts striking down a fair number of statutes when they believe 
that Congress has acted in an unacceptable, that is, unchastened way. 
The constitutional order might be chastened while the courts are 
quite self-confident. The Court's federalism decisions demonstrate re-
markably little concern about interfering with majoritarian decision-
making, perhaps because the justices are confident that judicial review 
has become a routine feature of our constitutional system. It is no 
longer, as Alexander Bickel thought it was, a "deviant" institution. Judi-
cial review disciplined the states during the New Deal-Great Society con-
stitutional order, and it disciplines the national government in the new 
order. The Court's self-confidence is revealed in cases like Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,19 where the joint opinion 
of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter took the position that the 
public ought to accept the Court's decisions simply because the Court is-
sued them. The Court's confidence is further revealed in the striking 
lack of deference to Congress' fact-finding and evaluative capacity in 
Morrison, where the Court noted - and then treated as irrelevant - Con-
gress' extensive factual inquiries and findings about the impact of vio-
lence against women on the national economy. 
On this view, the Court is not itself chastened, certainly not in its 
self-understanding. Yet the justices may not act aggressively no matter 
what their self-understanding may be. In the next decades, Congress will 
probably do little in the way of regulatory innovation, providing the 
courts with few opportunities to police the boundaries of the chastened 
constitutional order, except in cases directly implicating the transition 
from the Great Society regime to the present one. Further, the justices 
may find that their largest aspiration has already been achieved: the nor-
malization and routinization of judicial review. With that in place, the 
justices have nothing more to which to aspire. 
My principal point here is this: thinking about how the Constitu-
tion will shape - and will be shaped by - developments in this century 
must be forward-looking rather than backward-looking. I may be wrong 
in my description of the present constitutional order, and I may even be 
wrong that we are in a new constitutional order. But I am certain that we 
will not do a good job in thinking about the issues for the future if the 
way we think about them is shaped by the concerns of the immediate 
past. The Warren Court and even the Burger Court are things of the 
past. The guidance they gave for developing constitutional law may have 
some continuing normative value, but the descriptive accuracy of their 
decisions - that is, whether their decisions actually describe the current 
state of the law - is rapidly diminishing. 
19 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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Yet, as a sometime historian, I cannot deny the relevance of his-
tory. That accounts for my reference to the immediate past. Figures fur-
ther back in our constitutional history than Warren Burger and Earl 
Warren may help us think about the issues of the future. Thomas Jeffer-
son, James Madison, and Abraham Lincoln all offered subtle accounts of 
the relationship between the Constitution and the American people that 
continue to provide, if not guidance in the specific, then an orientation 
to thinking about the Constitution. Each helps us to understand the way 
in which the Constitution constitutes the American people, and the con-
stitution of the American people - that is, how we are constituted as a 
people - is likely to be one of the most persistent issues we will face over 
the next few decades. 
How we are constituted as a people is my second large theme. I 
want to introduce it by giving a label to a set of issues in constitutional 
law that often are doctrinally separated. The label is multicultural constitu-
tionalism - the constitutionalism of a multicultural state. I believe that 
multiculturalism will become a central concern for United States consti-
tutionalists in the next decades as the people of the nation rethink our 
national self-understanding in the face of m~or demographic transfor-
mations that are already underway. There are what we might call inci-
dents of multiculturalism in constitutional law already. The task of think-
ing about constitutionalism in this century is to figure out some way of 
placing these moments into a single constitutional narrative - something 
that sustains a unified state.20 
When one examines the areas in which contemporary constitu-
tional law has addressed issues of multiculturalism, one sees a striking 
pattern. The Court is deeply ambivalent about multiculturalism. It re-
peatedly acknowledges the fact of multiculturalism, and demonstrates an 
awareness that constitutional law must somehow come to grips with mul-
ticulturalism. But its resolution of the constitutional questions is more or 
less a systematic rejection of any claims that multiculturalism ought to al-
ter the rules that one would apply in a mono-cultural world. 
Perhaps the best way to see this is simply to go through some ar-
eas in which multiculturalism plays a role. Questions of multiculturalism 
in United States constitutional discourse may appear most prominently 
in the related disputes about the constitutionality of laws that regulate 
hate speech and sexually explicit material. I do not want to review the 
laws regarding these matters, but for the moment, the Supreme Court 
20 In saying this, I do not mean to endorse a presumption in favor of unity, ex-
cept insofar as solutions other than unity in a multicultural state are quite unat-
tractive. This is true whether they be regimes of discrimination and subordina-
tion, or regimes committed to "ethnic cleansing" so as to move in the direction 
of eliminating the source of multiculturalism. 
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appears to have resolved the issue by reaching a rather substantial con-
sensus that such laws are generally unconstitutional.21 To bring out one 
feature of the discussion of these laws that was sometimes obscured, we 
can think of the constitutional issue in this area as one about the max-
imization of speech opportunities in a multicultural setting. Thinking of 
the issue in this way may be more productive than thinking about the is-
sue as directly implicating the equality aspects of multiculturalism. 
The typical argument about these laws takes the following form: 
racist hate' speech interferes with the accomplishment of real equality 
among students on college campuses, by, for example, marginalizing mi-
nority students and reinforcing a sense that they should not be on the 
campus. Framed in these terms, the controversies fit comfortably within 
an existing doctrinal framework in which free expression rights can be 
limited in the service of other constitutional values only after all other 
methods of advancing those values have been exhausted.22 
However, there is another way of thinking about proposals to reg-
ulate hate speech and sexually explicit material. What is at stake is not a 
conflict between constitutional rights, but a conflict within the theory of 
free expression itself. Here the metaphor of "silencing" plays a large 
role. The argument is that the prevalence of hate speech - the speech of 
some people - suppresses the speech of others by silencing them, not in 
the sense that they are barred from speaking in any formal way, but in 
the sense that women must say twice as much - or say it twice as well -
before what they have to say is taken as seriously as what men have to 
say. The proposed regulations would be seen as efforts not to suppress 
speech, but to maximize it. What system of regulation will provide the 
public with the widest range of speech? Proponents of these regulations 
claimed that there would be more speech under their system than under 
one in which hate speech and sexually explicit material are widely availa-
ble. Clearly there are empirical questions bound up with this claim, and 
I take no position on what the answers to those empirical questions are. 
Note, though, that the speech-promoting argument in favor of hate 
speech regulation is predicated on the idea that ideas or voices should 
be heard more than they are. This is fundamentally a proposition about 
multiculturalism. . 
The hate-speech and pornography controversies are about the 
voices that different groups can add to our public dialogue. Their con-
sensus resolution suggests that a United States constitutional law gives 
21 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
22 The "free speech/fair trial» controversy provides the closest analogy. See, e.g., 
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Court's position is that 
speech-suppressing techniques are weapons of last resort in attempting to ad-
vance the constitutional interest of defendants in obtaining a fair trial. Id. 
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other interests a higher value than it gives the promotion of diversity. Di-
versity is doctrinally relevant in the law of affirmative action. I refrain 
from discussing that area in detail except to note that the Supreme 
Court has not yet definitively spoken on the relevance of diversity in the 
justification for affirmative action programs.23 The Court's opportunity to 
do so may have passed as the political support for affirmative action has 
waned.24 
There is another area in which there is a consensus position that 
rejects a certain version of multiculturalism. These cases involve the con-
stitutionality of removing people from juries simply because they are 
members of particular groups. The Supreme Court has held that the 
Constitution is violated when attorneys exercise their right to remove 
people from juries without cause when their reason for doing so is the 
person's race or gender.25 The Court's first decision in this line of cases 
was widely regarded as a vindication of the claims long asserted by civil 
rights activists. 
When the Court extended the holding to include a ban on gen-
der-based peremptory challenges, Justice O'Connor pointed out the ten-
sion between the law's formalistic refusal to let people take gender into 
23 The Court's most recent pronouncement, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200 (1995), held that affirmative action programs were subject to strict 
scrutiny, but did not invalidate the federal program. For the most recent ap-
pearance of the case in the Supreme Court, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Slater, 120 S.Ct. 722 (2000) (reversing a court of appeals decision holding the 
case moot and remanding it for consideration of the merits of the constitutional 
challenge). Considerations of diversity are at best remotely implicated in pro-
grams such as the one in Adarand, which involved affirmative action in awarding 
construction contracts. 
24 One might see in the Court's position a bit of the ambivalence I have men-
tioned. Perhaps one could see ambivalence as well in the widespread adoption 
of official English statutes that have almost no legal significance. In Arizonans for 
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997), the Supreme Court avoided decid-
ing on the constitutionality of an official English statute that, as construed, did 
have important effects. The Court directed that the case be sent to the state 
courts, which then held the statute unconstitutional. Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 
(Ariz. 1998). Rachel Moran pointed out, in comments on the initial version of 
this essay, that the Court's position with respect to Hispanics probably should be 
described as more mono-cultural and less ambivalent than I have represented is 
the case with respect to other aspects of multiculturalism. See, e.g., Hernandez v. 
New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (holding that peremptory challenges used to ex-
clude Latino jurors were not based on race). 
25 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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account and social reality: "We know that like race, gender matters."26 
Echoing a certain form of feminist argument, she suggested that women 
bring a distinctive voice to the jury room. Notice a certain peculiarity 
here: because women may bring a different voice into the jury room -
because they are different from men in this regard - lawyers must not 
take gender into account when they exercise their right to peremptory 
challenges - that is, they must treat men and women the same. As our 
casebook asks, "Is gender discrimination in jury selection unconstitu-
tional because the law recognizes that the genders speak with different 
'voice' and that both require representation, or because it insists that 
they speak with the same 'voice' and that distinctions between them are 
therefore irrational?"27 The answer one gives to that question is an index 
of the extent to which one is committed to a multiculturalist view of our 
constitutional law.28 I think it is significant that we are able to ask that 
question and leave it unresolved, with respect to the Court's actual 
decisions. 
In these areas we see that contemporary constitutional doctrine is 
- or at least ought to be - ambivalent about the constitutional status of 
multiculturalism. I want to conclude this survey by mentioning a final 
area in which the question of multiculturalism arises. It is a suitable con-
clusion for an essay in this symposium because it directly involves educa-
tion. The area is that of religious freedom and the anti-establishment 
principle. Of course, religion is one of the primary dimensions along 
which we are a diverse society, and religious disagreements were histori-
cally the reason for developing some sorts of constitutional constraints 
on government, so that it would be, to use my terms, suitably sensitive to 
multiculturalism. The contemporary controversy is over whether constitu-
tional doctrine is sufficiently sensitive to multiculturalist concerns. 
One set of controversies involves the public school curriculum. 
The Sixth Circuit's Mozert case provoked Nomi Stolzenberg's intriguing 
examination of multiculturalism and the public school curriculum.29 
Mozert involved parents who objected to the content of some aspects of 
the public school curriculum on the grounds that certain reading lessons 
the school gave their child communicated messages inconsistent with the 
26 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rei. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148 (1994) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) . 
27 GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 727 (3d ed. 1996). 
28 At least if one thinks it appropriate, as I do in this context, to think of woman 
as a category implicating culture. 
29 Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987); Nomi 
Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, 
and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L. REv. 581 (1993). 
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parents' religious beliefs.30 The school's response, and the court's, was 
basically this: we are in fact sensitive to questions of multiculturalism, but 
the day is short and curricula are hard to design. We have done a rea-
sonably good job of expanding our curriculum to be sensitive to mul-
ticulturalist concerns, but there are limits on what we can do. In particu-
lar, we cannot be faulted for developing a curriculum that is sensitive to 
multiculturalist concerns, but that is not sensitive to the concerns of 
those, like the parents here, who have objections to multiculturalism it-
self. These parents must understand that they are just one group within 
our multiculturalist society, and there is no way that we can privilege one 
such group over others without violating our commitment to 
multiculturalism. 
Within the context of the public school curriculum, that response 
has a great deal of force. Perhaps the only response might be those that 
Stolzenberg and Justice Marshall suggest. We might say to the schools, 
"Consider the messages about multiculturalism that you are sending. By 
denying the child the right to opt out of the required reading program 
and to substitute other readings, as the parents are willing to do, you are 
visibly expressing the limits of your commitment to multiculturalism. If 
you gave the child that right, everyone in the school would see how 
deep the commitment to multiculturalism goes." The suggestion is that 
schools should consider their implicit curricula as well as their explicit 
ones in describing their commitment to multiculturalism. 
But the schools might respond that the public school curriculum, 
both explicit and implicit, cannot reasonably be expected to carry the 
entire weight of a social commitment to multiculturalism.31 The parents 
could, of course, remove their children from the public schools and find 
private schools that offer the curriculum they want, or they could home-
school their children. These suggestions return us to the question of 
vouchers, for reasons that need no elaboration here. As of early 2000, re-
ligion clause doctrine might not support the constitutionality of vouchers 
that are usable at religiously affiliated schools. That is so, however, only 
because that doctrine might be taken to draw a formalistic line between 
direct monetary grants to religiously affiliated schools and indirect mon-
etary support of such schools. 
The role of an intellectually indefensible formalism in the Court's 
non-establishment doctrine resonates with my earlier discussio~. 
Throughout, we see constitutional doctrine grappling with issues arising 
out of multiculturalism, and resolving them in ways appropriate to the 
30 The children were not doing the readings because the school system believed 
that the children should get the messages; the readings were simply part of a 
general instructional program. 
31 Some passages in the court of appeals' opinion suggest this line of response. 
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distinct doctrinal areas, and yet, they are infected with a common 
ambivalence. 
I want to conclude with some thoughts about constitutional law's 
ambivalence about multiculturalism. 
In important ways the Constitution, with its opening words "We 
the People of the United States," is a document about national unity; a 
document that tries to create - at least through rhetoric - a single 
people of the United States, notwithstanding our wide differences. Cer-
tain kinds of multiculturalism deny the possibility that there could be a 
single people of the United States.32 Those versions of multiculturalism 
are, in a sense, anti-constitutional. Not, I hasten to add, in the sense that 
their adherents reject those aspects of constitutionalism that insist on the 
rule of law or on limits on government power, but rather, in the sense 
that those versions of multiculturalism reject the Constitution's aspiration 
to create - to constitute - a single people out of many (to translate 
our national motto). 
A multiculturalist constitutionalism would work out a way of un-
derstanding the Constitution that does several things at once. It must ac-
knowledge the fact of multiculturalism and make it relevant to our con-
stitutionalism. That in itself is no small thing. I am reminded here of 
Justice Scalia's forceful denial of that fact in Adarand, with his assertion 
that" [i]n the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is Ameri-
can. "33 The new way of understanding the Constitution must take seri-
ously not simply the value of living in a diverse society, but also the val-
ues of each segment of a multicultural society - beyond tolerance to 
understanding and appreciation. It must simultaneously sustain the sense 
of the United States as a single nation, united despite its internal diver-
sity. Rather than "out of many, one," we must to figure out how to say, 
"out of many, one that is many. "34 
32 I personally associate such versions of multiculturalism with the pathologies of 
identity politics, though not with identity politics as such. 
33 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (Scalia, j., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). I feel compelled to add that I find it 
troubling that at least for rhetorical purposes, Justice Scalia racialized a national 
identity, even though he meant to deny the relevance of race. 
34 In developing such an understanding, we might want to think as well about 
similar efforts in other constitutional systems. I have in mind in particular the 
reasonably self-conscious effort by Pierre Trudeau in Canada to use the patria-
tion of Canada's constitution as the vehicle for transforming Canada's self-
understanding from that of a bi-cultural nation to a multicultural one. By doing 
so, Trudeau hoped to address the concerns of Quebec's francophone popula-
tion while sustaining Canada as a single, albeit multicultural, nation. Trudeau's 
effort cannot yet be counted as a success, particularly with respect to Quebec it-
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That is no small task.35 Its difficulty is suggested by a metaphor 
Booker T. Washington used in his famous Atlanta Address over a century 
ago.36 For good strategic reasons, Washington described the people of 
the United States as being like the fingers on a hand, each one different 
and separate from the others, but all contributing to the effectiveness of 
the hand itself. In the abstract, that might not be a bad metaphor. Wash-
ington used it to defend his public accommodation of the Jim Crow seg-
regation system. I do not know whether a better version of something I 
might call multiculturalist unity can be developed. I do know, however, 
that the attempt to do so is going to be on the agenda of thinking about 
the Constitution in the present century. 
self, but neither is it yet a failure. 
35 Jurgen Habermas has addressed this issue, developing the thought that mul-
ticultural constitutionalism might require what he calls constitutional patriotism. 
See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS ANn NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS To A DIS-
COURSE THEORY OF LAw ANn DEMOCRACY 465-66 (William Rehg trans., 1996). 
Habermas's version of constitutional patriotism contains a strong universalist ele-
ment, which some have criticized as providing insufficient grounds to motivate a 
state's citizens to support that state's constitution. My version emphasizes the 
historically distinct commitments of the American people to our own (multicul-
turalist) constitutionalism, thereby uniting a universalist constitutionalism with a 
parochial one. 
36 See Booker T. Washington, The Atlanta Exposition Address, in BOOKER T. W ASH-
INGTON ANn HIS CRITICS 17 (Hugh Hawkins ed. 1974) ("In all things that are 
purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all 
things essential to mutual progress."). 
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